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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-1236 
_____________ 
  
MICHAEL REYNOLDS 
  
v. 
  
MUNICIPALITY OF NORRISTOWN, a/k/a Borough of Norristown;  
RUSSELL J. BONO; OFFICER CHARLES DOUGLASS, Badge #191;  
CORPORAL JOSEPH BENSON, Badge #178; OFFICER BRIAN GRAHAM, Badge 
#226; OFFICER LINDSEY TORNETTA; SERGEANT TIMS, Badge #109;  
SERGEANT LANGDON, Badge #161 
 
Officer Charles Douglass, Corporal Joseph Benson, 
Officer Lindsey Tornetta, Sergeant Tims,  
Appellants 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-15-cv-00016) 
District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quinones Alejandro 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 27, 2017 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 16, 2017) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
Officer Douglass, Corporal Benson, Officer Tornetta, and Sergeant Tims appeal 
the District Court’s decision not to grant them qualified immunity in Michael Reynolds’ 
§ 1983 suit against the Borough of Norristown and a number of its law enforcement 
officers.  For the reasons that follow, we will vacate and remand for a more robust 
qualified immunity analysis by the District Court. 
I 
 As we write for the benefit of the parties, we set out only the facts necessary for 
the discussion that follows.  On January 14, 2013, Norristown Police Corporal Joseph 
Benson (“Benson”) and Officer Charles Douglass (“Douglass”) discovered Michael 
Reynolds (“Reynolds”) inside a parked, running vehicle with damage to its front and 
passenger side.  Reynolds appeared disoriented, exhibited slurred speech, and had 
difficulty standing up, but did not smell like alcohol or exhibit signs of drug use, and 
denied that he had engaged in either.  The officers searched Reynolds’ car and person and 
found no evidence of alcohol or drug consumption.  
The officers summoned paramedics and opined that Reynolds was under the 
influence of drugs and that his condition was likely not accident-related.  Both the 
paramedics and Benson agreed, however, that Reynolds’ symptoms could be diabetes-
related1 and asked Reynolds if they could test his blood sugar levels.  Reynolds refused, 
                                                 
1 Reynolds has not produced any medical or other evidence showing he was ever 
diagnosed with diabetes.  
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and was subsequently arrested and transported by Douglass to the Norristown Police 
Department headquarters.  Benson remained on the scene, where he was told by 
Reynolds’ sister that Reynolds suffered from diabetes and hypertension and that he 
should be taken to the hospital.  Benson refused.  
 Douglass arrived at Norristown Police Department headquarters at approximately 
1:00 AM and carried an incapacitated Reynolds into the station.  Douglass listed 
Reynolds as intoxicated on an intake form and notified Sergeant Tims—who determined 
whether detainees required medical assistance—of Reynolds’ condition.  Tims agreed 
that Reynolds was simply intoxicated and the officers dragged Reynolds onto a holding 
cell cot.  Shortly thereafter, Reynolds rolled off of the cot and onto the floor, where he 
remained until 8:00 AM.  Appellee alleged that during the night, officers including 
Officer Lindsey Tornetta walked past Reynolds’ cell and left him on the floor without 
assistance.  Around 8:00 AM, officers returned to Reynolds’ cell, where they found him 
unresponsive and summoned an ambulance.  Reynolds was transported to Mercy 
Suburban Hospital where he was diagnosed with a cerebral hemorrhage and transferred to 
Thomas Jefferson University Hospital for treatment. 
 Reynolds filed an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania on January 5, 2015, alleging, inter alia, violations of his civil rights 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for (1) false arrest and imprisonment; and (2) failure to provide 
adequate medical treatment.  The Complaint named Officer Douglass, Corporal Benson, 
Sergeant Tims, and Officer Tornetta as defendants, among others.  Appellants moved for 
summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to sovereign immunity because the 
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arresting officers reasonably believed they had probable cause to arrest Reynolds, and 
because Reynolds refused medical treatment at the scene of the accident.  The District 
Court rejected Appellants’ arguments, explaining its decision not to extend qualified 
immunity in a two-sentence footnote.  Accordingly, Appellants’ motion for summary 
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity was denied.   
 Appellants timely appealed the District Court’s denial of summary judgment on 
the basis of qualified immunity for both the false arrest claims and the inadequate 
medical treatment claims.  
II2 
Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless the alleged facts, viewed 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that (1) each officer’s conduct violated 
one of plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (2) the right at issue was clearly established at 
the time of the violation.  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 20102 (2001).  “The relevant, 
dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it 
would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he 
confronted.”  Id. at 202.  This inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context 
of the case,” id. at 201, and must consider the “state of the law when the [conduct] 
occurred[,]”  Fields v. City of Phila., 862 F.3d 353, 361 (3d Cir. 2017).  
                                                 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction in this case under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 
1343(a)(3).  Our review of a district court’s denial of summary judgment on the basis of 
lack of qualified immunity is plenary.  Dougherty v. School Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 
986 (3d Cir. 2014).  That review includes “whether the set of facts identified by the 
district court is sufficient to establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional 
right.” Ziccardi v. City of Phila., 288 F.3d 57, 61 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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In assessing a police officer’s qualified immunity claim, the district court must 
include “at a minimum, an identification of relevant factual issues and an analysis of the 
law that justifies the ruling with respect to those issues.”  Forbes v. Twp. of Lower 
Merion, 313 F.3d 144, 149 (3d Cir. 2002).  A district court may not deny a summary 
judgment motion based on qualified immunity without “specify[ing] those material facts 
that are and are not subject to genuine dispute and explain[ing] their materiality.”  Id. at 
146.  Additionally, where multiple defendants seek qualified immunity against suit based 
on the same underlying factual circumstances, the district court must “analyze separately 
the conduct of each City Defendant.”  Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 123 (3d 
Cir. 1996).   
In this case, Appellants asserted qualified immunity on Appellee’s false arrest 
claim and inadequate medical care claim.  In declining to extend qualified immunity, 
however, the District Court did not specify the relevant material facts or analyze those 
facts in the context of each legal claim made by the Appellants.  Nor did the District 
Court conduct separate analyses for each individual seeking qualified immunity, although 
each defendant interacted with Reynolds in different ways and at different times 
throughout Reynolds’ detainment. As a result, the District Court’s opinion does not 
reflect the robust analysis directed by our holding in Forbes.  We appreciate the burden 
that Forbes and Grant impose on district courts when a plaintiff files multiple claims 
against multiple defendants from the same underlying facts, but nevertheless, that 
analysis must be undertaken. 
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III 
 We will therefore vacate the District Court’s denial of summary judgment on the 
basis of qualified immunity, and remand for the District Court to specify which material 
facts, if any, preclude qualified immunity as to (1) the false arrest claims against Corporal 
Benson and Officer Douglass, and (2) the inadequate medical treatment claims against 
Corporal Benson, Officer Douglass, Sergeant Tims, and Officer Tornetta, under the 
relevant standards for each claim.   
